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LECTURE ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND ITS MISSION

* * * *

PRESENTED AT THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 MARCH 1948

BY

THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BRIG. GENERAL E. K. WRIGHT, U. S. A.

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Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

THIS TALK, FROM MY VIEWPOINT, IS BEING APPROACHED WITH SOME SHYNESS AND CONSIDERABLE MISGIVING--WHEN I THINK OF THE STATURE OF YOUR USUAL GUEST SPEAKERS. BECAUSE OF THAT, AND WITH DEFERENCE TO MY AGE, I HOPE YOU WILL PERMIT A DEPARTURE FROM WHAT I UNDERSTAND IS A USUAL CUSTOM --HANDING MY PREPARED DISCUSSION TO THE DIRECTOR AND SHOOTING "OFF THE CUFF".

A DISCUSSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND ITS MISSION INVOLVES MANY ANGLES AND I PROPOSE TO COVER THEM UNDER THREE GENERAL HEADINGS:

1. THE BACKGROUND LEADING UP TO THE FORMATION OF SUCH AN AGENCY.

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

2. THE GENERAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE AGENCY AND ITS POSITION IN THE NATIONAL PICTURE.

3. A MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION OF SOME OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AGENCY.

LIKE ALL THINGS, AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE HAS A HISTORY. IT DEFINITELY HAS A LURID PAST. WE BELIEVE IT HAS A BRILLIANT FUTURE. BUT THAT FUTURE DEPENDS A GREAT DEAL ON A COMMON UNDERSTANDING BY ALL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE NEEDS OF THE NATION.

ONE OF THE GREATEST THINGS THAT HAS COME OUT OF THE RECENT WAR HAS BEEN THE TREMENDOUS GROWTH OF INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES AND THE AWARENESS OF BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ELEMENTS OF ITS EXISTENCE. BEFORE THE WAR, AS YOU KNOW, INTELLIGENCE

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

WAS MAINLY A STAFF FUNCTION RELEGATED, UNFORTUNATELY, TO AN ALL TOO SMALL A POSITION IN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

I THINK IT CAN BE SAID WITHOUT CHALLENGE THAT BEFORE THE WAR OUR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE COULD IN BUT FEW WAYS COMPARE WITH THAT OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA, GERMANY, OR JAPAN. WE HAD A POOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE BECAUSE THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY DID NOT BELIEVE IN IT. IT WAS FELT THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING UN-AMERICAN ABOUT ESPIONAGE AND EVEN ABOUT INTELLIGENCE GENERALLY.

AS THE UNITED STATES FOUND ITSELF SUDDENLY PROJECTED INTO A GLOBAL WAR, IMMENSE GAPS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE BECAME READILY APPARENT. THE WORD "INTELLIGENCE" QUICKLY

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

TOOK ON A FASHIONABLE CONNOTATION. EACH NEW WAR-TIME AGENCY -- AS WELL AS THE OLDER DEPARTMENTS -- SOON BLOSSOMED OUT WITH INTELLIGENCE STAFFS OF THEIR OWN, EACH PRODUCING A MASS OF UNCOORDINATED INFORMATION. THE RESULTANT COMPETITION FOR FUNDS AND SPECIALIZED PERSONNEL WAS A MONUMENTAL EXAMPLE OF WASTE. THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS DEVELOPED FULL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE STAFFS--AS DID THE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DIVISION OF O. S. S. THE BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE AND ITS SUCCESSOR, THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION, ALSO DELVED DEEPLY INTO THE FIELDS OF ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE. NOT CONTENT WITH STAFFS IN WASHINGTON, THEY ESTABLISHED BRANCHES IN LONDON, ON THE CONTINENT, AND IN THE PACIFIC AREAS.

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE, OFFICIALS REQUESTED A REPORT ON THE STEEL INDUSTRY OF JAPAN, OR THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, THEY HAD TO CHOOSE FROM THE REPORTS OF THE BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE, G-2, ONI, OR THE O. S. S. --JUST TO NAME A FEW. AND, BECAUSE THESE AGENCIES HAD COMPETED TO SECURE THE BEST PERSONNEL, IT WAS NECESSARY FOR EACH OF THEM TO BACK UP ITS EXPERTS BY ASSERTING THAT ITS REPORTS WERE THE BEST AVAILABLE AND THAT THE OTHERS MIGHT BE DISREGARDED.

THIS MIGHT BE A GOOD PLACE TO TALK A LITTLE ABOUT THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES--THE O. S. S. IT WAS ONE OF THE COMPETING AGENCIES MENTIONED. BUT REGARDLESS OF ITS VARIOUS ACTIVITIES IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND CERTAIN OF ITS KNOWN FAILURES,

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

IT NEVERTHELESS MARKED A TURNING POINT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR NATIONAL INTELLI-GENCE SYSTEM.

AS YOU KNOW, THE O. S. S. WAS ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF GATHERING TOGETHER MEN OF EXCEPTIONAL BACKGROUND AND ABILITY WHO COULD OPERATE IN THE FIELD OF NATIONAL, RATHER THAN DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE. IN WEIGHING THE MERITS OF THE O. S. S., ONE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT IT CAME LATE INTO THE FIELD. IT WAS A STOP-GAP. OVERNIGHT IT WAS GIVEN A FUNCTION TO PERFORM THAT THE BRITISH, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD BEEN DEVELOPING AGGRESSIVELY SINCE THE DAYS OF QUEEN ELIZABETH. WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THESE FACTS, THE WORK OF THE O. S. S. WAS QUITE REMARKABLE AND ITS FAILURES MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST ITS SUCCESSES. IT IS

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

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EXPRESSING IT LIGHTLY TO SAY THAT WE GREATLY PROFIT BY ITS ACTIVITIES, ITS EXPERIENCES, AND ITS MISTAKES.

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF OUR PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM WERE HIGH-LIGHTED BY THE STUDY AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WHICH INVESTIGATED THE ATTACK ON HAWAII. THE COMMITTEE MADE MANY SOUND RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO OUR PRESENT THINKING.

TO BRIEF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE, THEY FOUND THAT:

1. VERY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION HAD NOT BEEN CORRECTLY OR THOROUGHLY EVALUATED.

2. A GREAT DEAL OF IMPORTANT EVALUATED INFORMATION HAD NOT BEEN PASSED TO FIELD COMMANDERS.

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

3. OBVIOUS SOURCES HAD NOT BEEN EXPLOITED.

4. THE COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE HAD NOT BEEN COORDINATED.

TO BRIEF THEIR CONCLUSIONS EVEN FURTHER, THEY STRESSED THE FAILURE TO CENTRALIZE INTELLIGENCE.

WITHOUT BORING YOU WITH A MASS OF QUOTATIONS FROM THE REPORT, IT IS PERTINENT TO QUOTE ONE BRIEF PARAGRAPH:

"THE SECURITY OF THE NATION CAN BE INSURED ONLY THROUGH CONTINUITY OF SERVICE AND CENTRALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THOSE CHARGED WITH HANDLING INTELLIGENCE."

THE END OF THE WAR FOUND THE UNITED STATES IN A POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE AND POWER IN A VERY UNSTABLE

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4
SECRET

WORLD--AND THAT POSITION MAINTAINS TODAY. WE MUST NEVER AGAIN FIND OURSELVES CONFRONTED WITH THE NECESSITY FOR DEVELOPING PLANS AND POLICIES ON THE BASIS OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED, COMPILED, AND INTERPRETED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT WE FOUND OURSELVES IN JUST THAT POSITION, AS REGARDED THE EUROPEAN THEATRE, AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. FOR MONTHS WE HAD TO ~~TRUST~~ LEAN BLINDLY AND TRUSTINGLY ON THE SUPERIOR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM OF THE BRITISH. OUR SUCCESSES PROVE THAT THIS TRUST WAS WELL PLACED.

HOWEVER, IN MATTERS SO VITAL TO A NATION HAVING OUR RESPONSIBILITIES, THE UNITED STATES MUST NEVER AGAIN BE FORCED TO GO, HAT IN HAND, BEGGING A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4
SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

FOR THE EYES--THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE--
WITH WHICH TO SEE.

TO BRING US UP TO DATE -- OUR WAR EXPERIENCE, THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WHICH INVESTIGATED THE HAWAIIAN ATTACK, AND THE STUDIES OF MANY OTHER GROUPS AND COMMITTEES, FOCUSED ATTENTION ON THE NEED FOR A CENTRALIZED INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.

AS MOST OF YOU KNOW, A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY WAS ESTABLISHED BY EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE IN JANUARY 1946. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP WAS DESIGNATED AS THE OPERATING AGENCY OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY. SINCE THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP HAS ~~NOW~~ BEEN LEGALIZED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947--

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

UNDER THE NAME OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY--I SHALL NOT DISCUSS THE OLD ORGANIZATION FURTHER--BUT WILL PROCEED TO THE NEW.

YOU ARE ALL ACQUAINTED WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS FUNCTIONS. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS ESTABLISHED UNDER THIS COUNCIL. TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, THEREFORE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES THE PLACE OF THE OLD NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY, WHICH ~~IS~~ WAS SPECIFICALLY ABOLISHED BY THE ACT. IT THEREFORE IS THE AUTHORITY FOR DIRECTING THE PLANNING, DEVELOPMENT, AND COORDINATION OF ALL FEDERAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 PROVIDES FOR A DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TO BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT, BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE,

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

FROM EITHER CIVILIAN OR MILITARY LIFE. CERTAIN ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS ARE THEN INCLUDED, SO THAT THE DIRECTOR SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO THE USUAL SUPERVISION, RESTRICTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS WHICH APPLY TO MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES. IT PROVIDES THAT HE IS NOT TO POSSESS OR EXERCISE ANY SUPERVISION, CONTROL, POWERS OR FUNCTIONS--OTHER THAN THOSE HE WOULD EXERCISE AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE--OVER ANY COMPONENT OF THE ARMED SERVICES. THESE CLAUSES WERE INCLUDED IN THE ACT TO ASSURE TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE CONGRESS THAT THE DIRECTOR WOULD BE FREE FROM UNDUE SERVICE POLITICS OR INFLUENCE.

THE LAW SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT OUR AGENCY SHALL HAVE NO POLICE, SUBPOENA,

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS, OR INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS. WE ARE MOST HAPPY TO HAVE THIS INCLUDED IN THE LAW. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY URGED THAT CENTRAL INTELLI-GENCE HAVE NOTHING WHATSOEVER TO DO WITH POLICE POWERS OR FUNCTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. THE INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS ARE PROPERLY A PART OF THE WORK OF THE F. B. I., AND WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO INTERFERE WITH THIS. IT IS A BURDEN WHICH WE DO NOT WISH TO ASSUME.

WE HAVE CERTAIN DEFINITE FUNCTIONS UNDER THE LAW WHICH I WILL DESCRIBE.

FIRST IS THE DUTY TO MAKE RECOMMENDA-TIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE COORDINATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT INSOFAR AS THEY RELATE TO

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

THE NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS PLANNED COORDINATION IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN DETERMINING PRIMARY FIELDS OF INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES. WE ARE--IN THE FIELDS OF COLLECTION, EVALUATION, AND DISSEMINATION --WORKING TO PREVENT OVERLAPPING FUNCTIONS; THAT IS, TO ELIMINATE DUPLICATE ROLES AND MISSIONS. AND TO ELIMINATE DUPLICATE SERVICES IN CARRYING OUT THESE FUNCTIONS.

THE NEXT PROVISION OF THE LAW PROVIDES FOR THE CORRELATION AND EVALUATION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS IS A MAJOR COMPONENT OF A SUCCESSFUL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4
SECRET

THE LAW DIRECTS THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WILL PROVIDE FOR THE APPROPRIATE DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. IT MAKES THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS DIRECTED TO PERFORM, FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE EXISTING INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, SUCH ADDITIONAL SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN AS CAN BE MORE EFFICIENTLY ACCOMPLISHED CENTRALLY. AND THE AGENCY IS FURTHER DIRECTED TO PERFORM SUCH OTHER FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES RELATED TO INTELLIGENCE AFFECTING THE NATIONAL SECURITY AS THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MAY DIRECT.

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4
SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

IT MUST ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE LAW SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT THE DEPARTMENTS AND OTHER AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT SHALL CONTINUE TO COLLECT, EVALUATE, CORRELATE, AND DISSEMINATE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE. THE EFFICIENT CONDUCT OF THESE FUNCTIONS BY THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS WILL ACCRUE TO THE EFFICIENCY OF OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM. INFORMATION GATHERED IN THE FIELD IS SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS COLLECTION. THIS MATERIAL IS NECESSARY TO THAT DEPARTMENT IN THE COURSE OF ITS DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS. EACH DEPARTMENT MUST HAVE PERSONNEL AVAILABLE TO DIGEST THIS INFORMATION AND PUT IT TO SUCH USE AS IS NECESSARY <u>WITHIN</u> THAT DEPARTMENT.

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4
SECRET

THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES MUST BE CONSTANTLY INFORMED OF THE SITUATION WITHIN THEIR OWN FIELDS IN ORDER TO DISCHARGE THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO THE NATION. WITH THIS DEPARTMENTAL NECESSITY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WILL NOT INTERFERE. EACH DEPARTMENT MUST EVALUATE, CORRELATE, AND INTERPRET THAT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH IS WITHIN ITS OWN EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE AND WHICH IS NEEDED FOR ITS OWN DEPARTMENTAL USE.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, IN ADDITION TO ITS COORDINATING AND COLLECTION FUNCTIONS, MUST DEAL WITH INTELLIGENCE ON A NATIONAL, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A DEPARTMENTAL, LEVEL. THE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION CONDUCTED BY THE CENTRAL AGENCY MUST BE TURNED TO THE

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

SECRET

PRODUCTION OF ESTIMATES IN THE FIELD OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. ON THESE ESTIMATES THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS CAN DRAW A WELL-ROUNDED PICTURE ON WHICH TO BASE THEIR POLICIES. AND IT MUST BE CLEARLY BORNE IN MIND THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DOES NOT MAKE POLICY.

THE ESTIMATES FURNISHED IN THE FORM OF STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL POLICY INTELLIGENCE BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FILL A MOST SERIOUS GAP IN OUR FORMER INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE. THESE ESTIMATES MUST REPRESENT THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE, COMPLETE AND PRECISE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT. WITHOUT A CENTRAL RESEARCH STAFF PRODUCING THIS MATERIAL, OUR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM WOULD

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

MERELY RESEMBLE A COSTLY GROUP OF FACTORIES, EACH TURNING OUT COMPONENT PARTS, WITHOUT A CENTRAL ASSEMBLY LINE FOR THE FINISHED PRODUCT.

NOW AS TO A GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE CIA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE--AND I HOPE TO KEEP IT GENERAL AS I KNOW YOU MUST BE PLAGUED WITH THE REVIEW OF DETAILED ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS WHICH ARE IMMEDIATELY FORGOTTEN. YOU WILL NOTE FROM WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, IN ADDITION TO THE FUNCTION OF COORDINATING THE COLLECTION, EVALUATION, AND DISSEMINATING ACTIVITIES OF OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE, HAS CERTAIN COLLECTION, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, AND DISSEMINATING OPERATIONS

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

OF ITS OWN. TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS WE HAVE ESTABLISHED ~~FOUR~~ FIVE SEPARATE OFFICES EACH UNDER AN ASSISTANT DIRECTOR WITH AN OVER-ALL SERVICE TYPE OF EXECUTIVE STAFF.

LET US LOOK FIRST AT THE COMMAND AND STAFF PART OF THE PICTURE. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR ARE NOT ASSIGNED SEPARATE SPECIFIC TASKS AS IT IS INTENDED THAT THE DEPUTY BE THE ALTER-EGO OF THE DIRECTOR.

THE STAFF IS ACTUALLY BROKEN DOWN INTO TWO SEPARATE STAFFS, ONE PROVIDING THE NORMAL EXECUTIVE STAFF FUNCTIONS AND ANOTHER, SMALLER STAFF, WHICH CONSIDERS ONLY THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL PHASES OF OUR OPERATIONS. THE EXECUTIVE STAFF, HEADED

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

BY AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PROVIDES FOR THE PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATIVE, SUPPLY AND SERVICES, INVESTIGATIVE, AND AUDIT FUNCTIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION ON A WORLD-WIDE BASIS.

NOW AS TO THE ~~FOUR~~ FIVE MAJOR OFFICES.

THE OFFICE OF OPERATIONS PROVIDES FOR THE ENTIRE SCOPE OF OUR OVERT COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AND FOR THE CONDUCT OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF COMMON CONCERN TO ALL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES. THIS OFFICE IS RESPON- 25X1



Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

IT PROVIDES, THROUGH ITS DOCUMENT BRANCH, FOR THE SCREENING OF ALL FOREIGN DOCUMENTS, PERIODICALS, NEWSPAPERS, ETC., FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES.

THE OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES PROVIDES FOR THE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION OF ALL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH FLOWS IN FROM ALL SOURCES, ENGAGES IN COOPERATIVE EFFORTS IN THIS FIELD WITH ALL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, AND PREPARES THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES.

THE OFFICE OF COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION MONITORS THE FLOW OF ALL INCOMING AND OUTGOING INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL AND ASSISTS THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES IN OBTAINING THEIR WANTS ON A REQUEST BASIS.

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Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

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SECRET

THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS CONDUCTS ALL ORGANIZED FEDERAL ESPIONAGE AND COUNTER-ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS FOR THE COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. IT OPERATES FOR THE DIRECTOR IN COORDINATING, IN THE FIELD, THE COVERT AND OVERT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTING ACTIVITIES.

YOU WILL REALIZE THE NECESSITY FOR CENTRALIZING CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS IF WE DESIRE TO GIVE THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ITS HISTORY, AN ESPIONAGE SYSTEM ON AT LEAST A PAR WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS. IT IS TRUE THAT ONLY ABOUT 15 PER CENT OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION COLLECTED BY ALL AGENCIES WILL BE OBTAINED BY CLANDESTINE METHODS. YET THIS

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4
SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

GAP MUST BE FILLED AND THE INFORMATION THUS OBTAINED WILL OFTEN GREATLY EXCEL IN IMPORTANCE THE LARGER PERCENTAGE OBTAINED BY OVERT METHODS.

THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION BY CLANDESTINE MEANS HAS BEEN OVER-DRAMATIZED AND, UNFORTUNATELY, OVER-PUBLICIZED. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD FRANKLY ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED FOR AND PROVIDE THE MEANS OF COLLECTING THAT INTELLIGENCE WHICH CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED BY CLANDESTINE METHODS. IN THIS WE ONLY FOLLOW, LATE BY MANY YEARS, THE POLICY AND EXAMPLE OF EVERY MAJOR FOREIGN POWER.

WHEN PROPERLY PROVIDED FOR AND ESTABLISHED, THESE OPERATIONS MUST BE CENTRALIZED IN ONE AGENCY. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE BRITISH

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OVER HUNDREDS OF YEARS PROVES THIS. THE GERMANS VIOLATED THIS PRINCIPLE--AS DID THE ITALIANS AND THE JAPANESE--WITH KNOWN DISASTROUS RESULTS.

FAILURE ALWAYS MARKS A MULTIPLICITY OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. STUDY OF MANY INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, TALKS WITH PEOPLE WHO HAVE OPERATED IN THE FIELD OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME, AND INTERROGATION OF TOP INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS OF THE AXIS COUNTRIES, HAVE SHOWN CONCLUSIVELY THAT WHEN THERE ARE SEPARATE SERVICES, THE RESULT IS CHAOS. INTERNAL BICKERING AND SNIPING DEVELOPS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS SERVICES. THERE WERE TOO MANY GERMAN SPY ORGANIZATIONS, EACH OF THEM JEALOUS OF THE OTHER. THEY ALL DEVELOPED A POLICY OF SECRECY, SO THAT EACH MIGHT BE

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

THE GROUP TO PRESENT SOME JUICY TIDBIT TO THE LEADERS. COORDINATION WENT OUT THE WINDOW.

IF WE ARE TO ENGAGE EFFICIENTLY IN THE CLANDESTINE FIELD, THE MOST SENSITIVE OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, WE MUST DO IT WITH FULL REGARD TO THE EXPERIENCE AND METHODS OF THE FOREIGN ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN SO SUCCESSFUL.

~~IN CONCLUSION~~ I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT, AS AN OPERATING AGENCY, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOW OVER TWO YEARS OLD AND HAS THE OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTAIN FUNCTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR MANY MORE YEARS. WE FEEL THAT MUCH IS STILL TO BE DONE IN THE FIELD OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BUT WE ARE ALSO HAPPY

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

Approved For Release 2003/01/27 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001400150001-4

OVER THE PROGRESS TO DATE. WE HAVE BEEN WELL BACKED BY CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, THE CABINET, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND BY PUBLIC OPINION. WE HOPE WE CAN CONTINUE TO JUSTIFY THEIR TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.

THERE ARE NO DOUBT MANY QUESTIONS IN YOUR MIND AND I REALIZE THAT, FOLLOWING THIS PERIOD, I MUST STAND UP HERE AND "TAKE THEM." I ASSURE YOU THAT QUESTIONS WHICH CAN BE ANSWERED WILL BE ANSWERED FRANKLY AND SINCERELY. I HOPE YOU WILL FORGIVE ME IF I REFUSE AN ANSWER BECAUSE OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

IT HAS BEEN A PLEASURE AN AN HONOR TO BE HERE WITH YOU.

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